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1. Introduction 
Climate change policies often contain the dual objectives of trying to reduce the level of CO2 
emissions from the use of fossil-fuels while at the same time also trying to encourage the use of 
renewable energy sources especially in the area of electricity generation.1
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical analysis of the supply 
characteristics in the electricity generation sector. Section 3 considers the theoretical impacts of the 
imposition of a carbon tax or emissions trading scheme on this sector. Section 4 considers the issues 
of effectiveness and efficiency of climate change policies under different market conditions. Section 5 
applies the theoretical analysis to an examination of the European Union climate change policies. 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 These two objectives can be 
considered either as complementary or competing with each other depending on circumstances. If the 
electricity generation market is perfectly competitive with all technologies being subject to constant 
returns to scale (CRTS) and the supply of non-fossil fuel based (especially renewable) electricity is 
highly price elastic then putting an emission price on fossil-fuel based electricity will be sufficient to 
encourage a substitution towards renewable electricity and therefore there will be a reduction in CO2 
emissions while the impacts on overall electricity price and demand will be minimal. If, however, the 
electricity generation market is characterized by the existence of increasing returns to scale (IRTS) 
especially in some fossil fuel based electricity generation technologies which give rise to some degree 
of natural monopolistic power resulting in imperfectly competitive behavior in the electricity 
generation market, then in this case, putting a price on CO2 emissions may simply push up electricity 
supply price and reduce demand but will do little to encourage a substitution towards renewable 
electricity. The result is ineffectiveness or inefficiency for climate change policy because the 
achievement of the primary climate change policy (emissions reductions target) will be achieved but 
only with greater losses to electricity consumers and the economy. To improve on this efficiency, 
climate change policy may need to be supplemented with a secondary energy policy, such as the 
targeting of renewable energy (or electricity) share. This secondary policy will seek to correct for the 
imperfection in the electricity generation market, reducing overall electricity generation costs but also 
taking into account the objectives of the primary climate change policy. In this paper we illustrate this 
analysis with an examination of the European Union 20-20-20 climate change policies. 
2. Theoretical analysis of the electricity supply sector 
2.1 Constant returns to scale (CRTS) technology 
Consider an electricity generation technology which can be described as in Figure 1. Here the 
technology is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale (CRTS) which means both the short-run and 
long run marginal costs are unchanged with production level. Short run marginal cost (SRMC) often 
consists of fuel, material, labour and other running costs. Long run marginal cost will consist of 
SRMC plus a component which stands for incremental capital (or capacity) cost. If both of these 
components are constant with respect to the level of production (and capacity), then the technology 
can be said to exhibit CRTS. In this case, given any short run capacity level (such as QE in Figure 1) 
the short-run average total cost (ATC) will be a decreasing function of production level up to 
capacity. However, since capacity can be optimized with respect to long run demand level (assume to 
be DLR in Figure 1), the level of ATC will be such that when production is close to capacity ATC will 
reach a minimum level and this is also equal to the LRMC. Of course in the short run, demand may 
fluctuate around the long-run level. When it is higher than DLR (such as D2 in Figure 1) then to 
                                                          
1 A third objective is also often pursued and that is the improvement in energy efficiency. This third objective however is more in line with 
the general economic objective of improving on economic productivity and hence can be examined separately from the other components 
of the climate change policy. 
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balance supply (capacity) with short-run demand, price may have to rise above the LRMC. 
Conversely, if short run demand is lower than long run demand (D1 in Figure 1), then to ensure 
capacity is fully utilized, price may have to drop below LRMC (even if this means the supplier is 
making some a loss in the short run, but this is to ensure social welfare is maximised). So long as 
demand returns to DLR in the long run, however, long run supply price will always be equal to the 
level of LRMC. Electricity supply curve in the long-run therefore can be regarded as given by a 
horizontal line at the level of the LRMC. With different technologies which may have different 
LRMCs, the long run supply curve may consist of s series of step functions rather than a horizontal 
line. Furthermore, with increasing competition for scarce resources when production level is 
increased, rising resource prices2
2.2 Increasing returns to scale (IRTS) technology 
 may push up the levels of LRMCs and hence in practice, the long 
run supply curve for electricity generation with CRTS technologies will be a series of slightly upward 
sloping step functions which can be approximated by a smooth upward sloping curve (as shown in 
Figure 2). 
Now consider the case when returns to scale cannot be assumed to be constant. This may be the case 
when capital (capacity) is not continuously variable but can only be changed by large (‘lumpy’) 
amounts. In this case capacity will not always be matched with long run demand and the ATC will not 
always be able to reach its optimum (LRMC) level. The ‘long run’ ATC therefore cannot be described 
as the horizontal line at the LRMC level but in fact will be identical to the short run ATC where 
capacity is fixed at a particular ‘long run’ level. With the ATC decreasing with production level, this 
implies there is increasing returns to scale of production3
2.3 Strategic interactions between CRTS and IRTS technologies 
 and this has important implications for the 
producer’s pricing behaviour as will be explained in the following sections. 
A producer with IRTS can be said to possess some degree of ‘natural monopolistic power’ (Baumol, 
1977) because IRTS implies a cost advantage for an incumbent producer which it can use to deter 
entry by any potential entrant who may use the same technology. However, in a market with both 
IRTS and CRTS technologies, monopolistic power by the IRTS producer(s) is not absolute, but only 
relative and depending on the extent of imperfect competition between IRTS and CRTS producers. 
In Figure 3, we compare the supply behaviour of IRTS and CRTS producers within the same 
electricity market. Given an aggregate demand curve for electricity (described by the line D in Figure 
3(c)), if we take away the aggregate supply of all CRTS technologies (described by an upward sloping 
curve as shown in Figure 3(b)) then we are left with a ‘residual’ demand for all IRTS technologies.4
                                                          
2 Or the use of inferior resources, for example, with wind technologies, poorer quality locations may need to be used with increased 
production level. 
 
Based on this residual demand curve, individual IRTS suppliers can then compete for market share 
and assuming that each supplier acts as a Cournot competitor within this residual market (i.e. by 
deciding on production level rather than on price level which it cannot affect completely and directly) 
the equilibrium outcome of this Cournot competition will determine the supply price for the IRTS 
producers and therefore also for the CRTS producers. For Cournot competition, it is well known that 
the equilibrium outcome will be somewhere between the absolute monopolistic position (point M in 
Figure 3(a)) and the ‘perfectly competitive’ position where each producer can earn only  zero pure 
profit (point A in Figure 3(a)). Assume that this equilibrium outcome is given by point I in Figure 3(a) 
(‘I’ can stand for Imperfectly competitive outcome). Given this equilibrium position for the ‘residual’ 
IRTS market, the outcome for the rest of the CRTS market will be determined based on the price 
elasticity of demand (in the aggregate electricity market) and the price elasticities of supply (of the 
CRTS technologies). This can be explained as follows. 
3 Even though not to scale of capacity because the capacity is here fixed.  
4 There may be more than one IRTS technologies, for example, coal-based as well as hydro and nuclear power electricity technologies. 
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Let qi be the output of an individual supplier i in the IRTS market, qc be the output of an individual 
supplier c in the CRTS market, and Q is the total level of electricity demand in the total market. We 
have: 
CI
c
c
i
i QQqqQ +=+= ∑∑  (1) 
Let Si = (qi/QI) be the relative market share of supplier i in the IRTS market and assuming that this 
market share is initially independent5
D
Ie
 of the strategic decisions of the IRTS suppliers. This means the 
aggregate price-elasticity of demand for total IRTS electricity output ( ) must be related to the 
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Similarly, let Sc = (qc/QC) be the relative market share of supplier c in the CRTS market and assuming 
that this market share is initially independent of the strategic decisions of the IRTS suppliers, then the 
aggregate price-elasticity of supply for total CRTS electricity output ( SCe ) must be related simply to 
the individual price elasticity of supply of each CRTS output ( Sce ): 
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Since electricity can be assumed to be a homogeneous commodity in demand (even though 
heterogeneous in supply due to differences in supply technologies) the price-elasticity of demand for 
all IRTS electricity outputs can be assumed to be the same and therefore it is also equal to the 
aggregate price elasticity of demand for all IRTS electricity output (i.e. Die =
D
Ie  for all i’s).
 6 From 
equation (1), we can also derive a relationship between the aggregate price elasticity of demand for all 
IRTS electricity and aggregate price elasticity of supply for all CRTS electricity (if we assume that 
the percentage changes in price in all markets are the same,7 P∂ i.e. /P = II PP /∂ = CC PP /∂ ): 
                                                          
5 Initially, market shares are unaffected (or negligibly affected) by the oligopolist’s decision even though the absolute quantities and prices 
can be. This assumption, however, applies only to ‘short run’ analysis when price and quantity changes can be regarded as relatively 
‘small’. In the long run, short run changes can be used to ‘update’ the market shares, hence the shares in the long run do not have to be 
assumed as constant or unaffected by the oligopolist decisions. 
6 Individual price elasticity of supply for CRTS electricity, however, is different for different CRTS technologies, therefore in general we will 
have ( SC
S
c ee ≠ ). 
7 In all the graphs, we show the equilibrium prices in all market to be at the same level. This is because electricity is a homogeneous 
commodity; hence its resultant supply price must be the same. However, in practice, differences in qualities of supply and transmission 
costs) may result in differences in the levels, but to maintain the assumption of homogeneity in the nature of the product supplied, we 
assume that percentage changes in its price (due to equilibrium adjustment in the market following changes to production cost) must be 
similar for all technologies.  
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Here De is the aggregate price-elasticity of demand for electricity in the total electricity market and SI 
= (QI/Q), SC = (QC/Q) are the aggregate shares of IRTS and CRTS electricity supply in the total 
market respectively. 
Given the relative market shares and price-elasticities of demand and supply for all technologies, we 
can now derive the equilibrium position for the IRTS electricity supplier. First, define the (short run) 8
][ iiiii FqmPq −−=π
 
profit function for this supplier as: 
 (5) 
where qi is the output level of supplier i, mi is the SRMC of supplier i (assumed to be constant with 
respect to output but can be influenced by factors such as taxes and per unit transmission costs 
specific to each supplier), Fi is the level of fixed cost. Maximising this profit function with respect to 
qi will give the following first order condition for each supplier i: 
s' allfor )];/(1/[ ieSmP DiiiI −=  (6) 
Substituting the values of (equilibrium) elasticities as determined from equations (2)-(4) into (6) and 
assuming that Die =
D
Ie  for all IRTS suppliers, we have: 
})])/()/1/{((1/[ SCIC
D
IiiI eSSeSSmP +−=  (7) 
Equation (7) can be used to forecast the changes to the equilibrium price level PI in the IRTS 
electricity market following a ‘shock’ to the value of SRMC (mi) which may be caused, for example, 
by the imposition of a carbon tax. This change to the equilibrium price can be affected by several 
factors: firstly the changes to the level of short run marginal cost in the IRTS market (mi) due to the 
imposition of the carbon tax itself; secondly the relative shares of different technologies (Si, SI, SC); 
thirdly, the aggregate price-elasticity of demand for the electricity market as a whole ( De ); and 
finally, the aggregate price-elasticity of supply of CRTS electricity ( SCe ). Given any changes in the 
quantity and price level in the IRTS market, the changes in price and quantity level in the CRTS 
market as well as in the aggregate supply market can then be inferred, using the overall quantity 
restriction (1) and relationship between aggregate price elasticities as described by equation (4). 
  
                                                          
8 In the short run, capital (capacity) is assumed to be fixed, hence we distinguish between short run marginal (running) cost (SRMC) and 
average fixed (i.e. capital or capacity) cost (AFC). The sum of these two terms make up the average total cost (ATC). 
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Figure 1:  Cost curves for a technology with constant returns to scale in the long-run when capital is 
infinitely divisible (i.e. continuously variable). 
 
 
Figure 2:  Agregate long run supply curve for all technologies with constant returns to scale and with 
continuously variable capital level. 
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Figure 3:  Strategic behaviour in the supply of electricity between (a) firms with IRTS technologies, (b) firms with CRTS technologies, in (c) the aggregate electricity 
supply market (graphs are not to scale). 
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3. Impacts of climate change policies in the electricity 
generation market 
Consider now the impacts of the imposition of a carbon tax or an emissions trading scheme9 in the 
electricity generation market. Assuming that at least one of the IRTS technologies (such as coal-based 
electricity) is affected by the carbon tax.10 Following the imposition of a carbon tax in electricity 
market, the SRMC and hence also the ATC of the coal-based technology will shift upwards as shown 
in Figure 4(a) while assuming that the LRMCs of the CRTS technologies will remain unchanged.11 
Depending on the shape and position of the ATC curve of the IRTS technology relative to its strategic 
demand curve, this shift in the ATC curve can produce two possible outcomes. If the initial position 
of the ATC curve is relatively high and close to the strategic demand curve (for example, when 
aggregate demand in the IRTS electricity is low and/or the share of coal-based IRTS electricity in this 
market is small) and also if the slope of the strategic demand curve is relatively ‘flat’ (due to the high 
price elasticity of supply of renewable electricity – see equation (5)), then a small upward shift in the 
ATC curve may bring it close to touching the strategic demand curve, or even lying above it. This 
means the three points M, I, A will merge to a single point (I’ in Figure 4(a)) or even disappear 
altogether.12 The reduction in coal-based electricity production in this case is quite significant and so 
is the increase in renewable electricity production (Figure 4(b)). The total impact on aggregate 
electricity price and quantity is small (Figure 4(c)). 13
In contrast, if we now consider an opposite situation where the supply of renewable electricity is price 
inelastic which makes the residual demand for coal-based electricity also price inelastic. Any upward 
shift of the ATC curve in this case will result in a large increase in the supply price of electricity but 
only with a small reduction in the level of coal-based electricity production. The increase in 
renewable electricity supply is also small and the overall impact on aggregate electricity price is large 
and this can result in large welfare losses to the consumers. The effectiveness of climate change 
policy in this case is therefore much reduced and this situation can be referred to as ‘the worst case 
scenario’ for climate change policy (Figure 5). 
 Climate change policy in this case therefore can 
be said to be most effective with large reduction in CO2 emission being associated with small changes 
in overall electricity supply price. This can be referred to as the ‘best case scenario’ for climate 
change policy. 
We can now compare the above two scenarios with the case of ‘conventional’ analysis where all 
electricity generation technologies are assumed to be subject to CRTS and the supply market for 
                                                          
9 From an efficiency point of view, a carbon tax (CT) is not different from an emission trading scheme (ETS). However, from a practical 
and distributional viewpoint, they can be different depending on how the revenue from the CT or revenue from the auctioning of the 
emissions permits in an ETS is recycled. Here we are not considering these issues hence we will treat the CT or an ETS as though 
equivalent. 
10 Other IRTS technologies can be non-fossil fuel based, such as nuclear or hydro electricity and these are not directly affected by the 
carbon tax. 
11 For simplicity of exposition, we assume that all renewable electricity technologies are of the CRTS type. In practice, some fossil-fuel 
based technologies can also be subject to CRTS. In this latter case, the aggregate supply curve of CRTS technologies will also shift 
upwards following the imposition of a carbon tax. This minor detail will not affect the basic arguments of our analysis which focus mainly 
on IRTS technologies. 
12 This means the plant will become uneconomic and has to shut down. This, however, applies only to the marginal plants while the intra-
marginal plants can still continue to operate due to the existence of some degree of cost buffer (i.e. their ATC curves may still remain 
below the strategic demand curve). 
13 Note that for convenience of illustration, in Figure 5 (and subsequent Figures) we show the level of supply prices PI, PC, and P as 
though they are on the same absolute level. However, in practice, because of differences in qualities of supply and transmission costs, 
these price levels can differ in absolute terms, even though in percentage change terms, they can be assumed (as in equation (5)) to be 
similar, i.e. PP /∂  = II PP /∂ = CC PP /∂ . 
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electricity is assumed to be perfectly competitive (see Figure 6). In this case, following the imposition 
of a carbon tax which shifts both the SRMC and LRMC curves for coal-based electricity upward as 
seen in Figure 6(a), the effect of this shift will be a cut back in the production of coal-based 
electricity. This is then compensated for by an increase in the supply of renewable electricity (if the 
price elasticity of supply of renewable electricity is large) hence the net result will be just a small 
reduction in total electricity supply and a small increase in overall electricity price.14
4. Effectiveness of climate change policies 
 This 
‘conventional’ scenario produces an outcome which is closer to the IRTS ‘best case’ scenario. 
From a theoretical viewpoint, emissions trading scheme or carbon tax is the most efficient (or cost 
effective) instrument to be used for achieving any given level of CO2 emissions reduction. From the 
analysis given in the previous section, it can be seen that this conclusion depends on the particular 
characteristics of the production technologies and also the structure of the electricity market. If the 
market is perfectly competitive with all suppliers behaving as price takers with constant returns to 
scale (CRTS) technologies and highly price elastic supply curves, then this conclusion certainly holds 
true. If, however, a dominant coal-based electricity supplier is using an IRTS technology which 
allows it to possess some degree of ‘natural monopolistic’ power in the market, then imperfect 
competition in this market may produce results which are quite different from those predicted by 
perfectly competitive analysis. To correct for the distortions created by imperfect competition, climate 
change policy may need two rather than one policy components: one (emissions reduction target) to 
correct for the environmental externality, but the second (renewable energy or electricity share target) 
is to correct for market imperfection in the electricity market. This imperfection prevents optimal 
technology substitution in the electricity sector which implies the overall costs of electricity 
production (including emission abatement costs) may not be minimised and therefore the efficiency of 
the first component of the climate change policy may not be maximised. 
To explain this, we re-examine the IRTS ‘worst case scenario’ as described in the previous section 
(see Figure 5) but now with the use of a secondary energy policy to improve on the effectiveness of 
the primary climate policy. In Figure 7(a) we assume that with the full15
To avoid this situation from happening, the government can use a secondary policy aiming at 
increasing the supply of renewable electricity, from Q’C to Q
t
C, but without the risk of electricity price 
rising above the level P’. The policy can consist of simply stipulating a mandatory renewable 
electricity share equal to [QtC/(Q
t
I + Q
t
C)]. To achieve this share, renewable electricity production 
must increase but without a price increase, this can only mean a shift of the supply curve rightwards 
from position N’ to N*, and this can only occur if there is a subsidy to the production of renewable 
electricity. The rightward shift in the supply curve of renewable electricity will imply a leftward shift 
in the ‘residual’ demand curve for  IRTS electricity from I’ to I*. In subsidising the production of 
renewable electricity, a deadweight loss equal to the area N’N*N** will be incurred but this can be 
compensated for by the savings in emissions abatement cost (or carbon tax payment by IRTS 
suppliers) equal to the area GHKL. So long as the area GHKL is at least as great as the area N’N*N** 
then the renewable electricity share targeting policy can be regarded as efficient. For this efficiency to 
be achieved, the following condition must be satisfied (see Appendix for more details): 
 application of the primary 
policy instrument (carbon tax), the primary target of CO2 emissions reduction is still not achieved 
(due to the existence of imperfect competition), i.e. production of coal-based electricity is reduced 
from QI to Q’I rather than Q
t
I as required. To try to reduce production further to Q
t
I will require a even 
larger carbon tax which will produce a risk of increasing the electricity price still further from P’I to P”I  
which is quite high resulting in substantial welfare losses to the consumers equal to the area of the 
triangle E’E”E* as shown in Figure 7(c). 
                                                          
14 This depends on price elasticities of supply of all technologies but also on the aggregate price elasticity of demand for electricity. 
15 By this we mean the maximum value of the carbon tax needed to achieve the emissions reduction target if in fact the electricity supply 
market is characterised by CRTS and perfect competition. 
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PC(.) represents the supply curve for renewable electricity, therefore the terms in the bracket on the 
left hand side of equation (8) represents the  amount of ‘subsidy’ to be provided to renewable 
electricity production. The function T(.) on the right hand side of equation (8) stands for the marginal 
abatement cost (or carbon tax payment) function for the IRTS coal-based electricity producer, 
therefore equation (8) says that efficiency is maximised if the ‘subsidy’ to renewable electricity 
production is equal to the (savings in) abatement cost (or carbon tax payment) at the margin. Under 
the ‘perfectly competitive’ market assumption and with an efficient emission trading scheme 
condition (8) can be achieved automatically without government intervention because producers being 
price takers will try to minimise production cost to maximise profit. Cost minimisation in this 
situation requires that a producer of electricity will take into account the emission cost if a unit of 
coal-based electricity is produced, but also the savings or reduction in production cost if a unit of 
renewable electricity is produced instead. Therefore, condition (8) will automatically be applied. to 
the electricity sector if total electricity production cost is minimised. Condition (8) may be achieved in 
practice either by cross-subsidising between coal-based an renewable electricity production if a 
producer uses both of these technologies, or it can come about from emissions trading between coal-
based and renewable electricity producers. There is thus no need for government intervention 
provided the market works perfectly with producers being price takers as described. The only obstacle 
to this perfect market condition is the fact that producers of coal-based electricity may not behave as 
perfectly competitive price takers because of the existence of IRTS in their production, hence it may 
be in their interests of some (IRTS) producers to let the price rise above the ‘efficient’ level to 
maximise their own profit rather than be concerned with minimum production costs for the industry.as 
a whole. Condition (8) therefore may not be achieved. To restore this efficiency condition, 
government may want to provide an actual subsidy to renewable electricity to help its production level 
towards the most efficient level. However, government may also want to impose a mandatory 
renewable electricity share target without providing any subsidy. This will force the producers to 
achieve the optimum condition (8) and bear the nomimal costs of this policy. The real costs (and 
distribution of the benefits) however depends on the ultimate rise in electricity price, which in turn 
depends on the relativity of the price elasticities of supply and demand for electricity faced by 
different producers. In other words, the efficiency of the mandatory renewable electricity targeting 
policy is not dependent on the distribution of the benefits and costs of such a policy (which depends 
on whether an actual government subsidy is provided or not or whether the revenue of the carbon tax 
or an emission trading scheme16
 
 is recycled back into the industry), but only on the magnitude of the 
targets and for these targets to be ‘optimal’ (i.e. most efficient), they must follow from condition (8). 
                                                          
16 In the case when emissions permits in such a scheme are auctioned rather than by ‘grand-fathering’ i.e. distributed freely. 
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Figure 4:  Best case scenario: impacts of the imposition of a carbon tax in the electricity market when the share of IRTS technologies is small and the supply of CRTS 
electricity is price elastic (graphs are not to scale). 
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Figure 5:  Worst case scenario: impacts of the imposition of a carbon tax in the electricity market when the share of IRTS technologies is large and the supply of CRTS 
electricity is price inelastic (graphs are not to scale). 
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Figure 6:  Conventional analysis of the impacts of the imposition of a carbon tax in the electricity market when all technologies are assumed to exhibit CRTS with price 
elastic supply and all suppliers are price takers in a perfectly competitive market (graphs are not to scale). 
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Figure 7:  The use of a secondary instrument to correct for a market imperfection to improve on the effectiveness of primary climate change policy and maintain its 
efficiency (graphs are not to scale). 
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5. Applications to the case of the European Union climate 
change policies 
We apply the approach described in the previous sections to analyse the impacts of the 
European Union (EU) climate change policies using a model called WIATEC.17 The EU climate 
change policies are aimed at contributing to the world climate change strategy which aims to 
limit the rise in global average temperature to 2°C above pre-industrial levels (CEC, 2008). The 
range of policies undertaken by the EU consists of three main components: (1) a commitment to 
reduce the level of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the EU by 20% compared to 1990 level 
by the year 2020 (30% reduction if there is an international agreement), (2) an increase in the 
share of renewable energy in final energy consumption to 20% by 2020, (3) an increase in 
energy efficiency by 20% by 2020. To reduce GHG emissions by 20% below 1990 level by 
2020, the EU relies on the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). This scheme was 
launched on January 1, 2005 and aims to control the level of CO2 emissions by large and 
medium sized installations in the energy and industry production sectors18 which cover about 
45% of the total CO2 emissions in the European Union. Emissions by other installations and 
sectors not covered by the EU-ETS are controlled through other regulations. To reduce the total 
level of CO2 emissions in the EU by 20% below 1990 level (or about 14.6% below 2005 level) 
the level of emissions by the EU-ETS sectors need to be cut by about 20% below the 2005 level 
and that of the non-ETS sectors by about 9.1%. To increase the share of renewable energy usage 
in energy consumption activities, the EU introduced policies such as feed-in tariff in the 
electricity sector and the use of bio-fuels in the transport sector. To improve on energy 
efficiency in consumption activities, there are policies which help to provide finance for 
national and local schemes that aim to improve on energy-efficiency in the residential housing 
sector. This sector accounts for about 25% of the total energy consumption in the EU. In this 
paper, we consider only the first two components of the EU climate policies, namely emissions 
reduction target and renewable energy share target, and consider some experiments which will 
try to simulate these two policies.19
5.1 Scenarios 
 
First, we define a Reference or ‘Business-as-Usual’ (BaU) Scenario which can be used as a 
reference point for comparison with other scenarios. The Reference Scenario is based on two 
major sets of assumptions, one regarding real GDP20 growth and the other, population growth 
(see Table 1). The projected BaU growth rates for GDP and population are based on UROSTAT 
and UNDP statistics.21
                                                          
17 See Truong and Kemfert (2010). 
 In addition to GDP and population growth rates, we also make some 
18 The energy sector consists of combustion installations with a rated thermal input exceeding 20 MW, and also installations 
handling mineral oil refineries, coke ovens. The production sector consists of installations producing and processing ferrous 
metals, minerals (cement clinker, glass and ceramic bricks), pulp, paper, and also other activities. 
19 See also Kemfert et al (2006) for more details on similar experiments. 
20 GDP is only a ‘proxy’ for general resource utilization level. What ‘drives’ emissions are growth rates of individual resource 
factors such as employment, capital, land-use and natural resources (energy). To some extent, capital growth is determined 
endogenously within the model but labour (employment) and natural resource growth are still to be determined exogenously. 
Hence, when GDP growth is set as an exogenous assumption, the growth of employment and natural resources will to some 
extent be determined by this assumption. 
21: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database   
     http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/dnlList.asp. 
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assumptions on the future changes in emission intensity22
Next, we define a scenario which can simulate the implementation of the first component of the 
EU climate policies (i.e. the reduction of CO2 emissions in the EU by 20% compared to 1990 
level by 2020). This reduction is achieved via the implementation of the EU emissions trading 
scheme (ETS) therefore we refer to this as the EU-ETS scenario. Table 4 shows the level of CO2 
emissions under the EU-ETS scenario and this can be compared with emissions level for the 
Reference scenario as shown in Table 3. It can be seen that under the EU-ETS scenario, 
emissions in the EU27 as a whole would decrease by 15.2% (implying a net decrease of some 
24% compared to the Reference scenario) while that of the world as would have increased by 
56.6% (assuming that the rest of the world except the EU27 would not implement any climate 
change policies) a net decrease of some 8% compared to the Reference scenario. The split 
between EU-ETS trading sectors and non trading sectors is as follows: trading sectors would 
decrease emissions by 20% as a result of the ETS (instead of increasing by 13.2% as in the 
Reference scenario), while non-trading sectors would decrease emissions by 10% (instead of 
increasing by 3.8% as in the Reference scenario). 
 by running the WIATEC model over 
the historical period 2005-2007 and then use the results in this historical simulation to provide 
some forecast for future levels. These are shown in Table 2. The resulting emission levels for 
the Reference scenario is shown in Table 3. It can be seen that under the Reference scenario, the 
level of CO2 emissions in the EU27 would have increased by 8.7% (from 2005 to 2020) while 
that of the world as would have increased by 64.4%. 
We note that the EU-ETS is implemented over three phases: 2005-2007, 2007-2012, and 2012-
2020. In the first and second phases, it is assumed that there are national allocation plans 
(NAPs) which distribute emissions caps for the ETS sectors in each member countries of the 
EU. Although there are separate plans, because emission permits are traded freely between EU 
regions, this will result in a single uniform permit price for all EU countries. The ETS-sectors 
permit price however will differ from the shadow prices or marginal emission abatement costs 
in the non-ETS sectors. In theory there can be as many shadow prices as there are regulation 
regimes in the non-ETS sectors. However, to simplify the analysis and for comparison with the 
ETS sectors, we assume that there is only a single uniform shadow price for emissions in the 
non-ETS sectors. 23
We can estimate the permit price or carbon tax for the EU-ETS scenario under three conditions. 
Firstly, under ‘conventional analysis’ where all electricity supply technologies are assumed to 
be subject to constant returns to scale and t     he supply market is perfectly competitive with all 
suppliers acting as price takers who try to minimise the total cost of production by ensuring that 
at the margin, all marginal costs of production by all technologies must be the same.
 
24 We will 
refer to this situation as the (EU-ETS) PC (‘perfect competition’) scenario. Next, under the 
hypothesis that coal based electricity supply (as well as hydro and nuclear powered electricity)25
                                                          
22 Alternatively, we can also use the rate of change in energy intensity (or its inverse, the rate of improvement in energy efficiency) 
as a measure of technological change in the energy sector. We use (the rate of change in) emission intensity for convenience 
because emissions is the policy variable of interest in this paper. 
 
may be subject to increasing returns to scale and producers using these technologies may not 
23 Although the reduction in CO2 emissions in the EU is via an emission trading scheme rather than via a carbon tax, hence we 
refer to an emissions trading price or marginal abatement cost. This is however, also equal to the ‘carbon tax’ if such a tax is 
imposed to achieve the same emissions reduction target, hence we often use the terms permit price, marginal abatement cost, 
and carbon tax interchangeably. 
24 This implies a condition such as equation (8) must be satisfied and this is achieved under perfect competition because all 
producers are price takers, hence profit is maximised only if costs of production (including emissions costs) must be minimised. 
25 Hydro and nuclear powered electricity, however, are not subject to carbon tax, hence their behaviour 
will not impact directly on the electricity market as compared to those of coal-based electricity producers. 
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behave as price takers in a perfectly competitive market, but as Cournot strategic suppliers26. 
using their degrees of monopolistic power to set their own production level and maximise their 
(regulated or unregulated) profits. We refer to this situation as the (EU-ETS) IC (imperfect 
competition) scenario. With this scenario, we distinguish between two different situations: one 
where there is no government intervention to correct for the imperfection in the market and we 
refer to this as the ICN (‘N’ for no government intervention) scenario, and one with government 
intervention in the form of a mandatory renewable electricity share target (as discussed in 
section 4. We refer to this latter situation as the ICW (‘W’ for with government intervention) 
scenario. 27
Table 1:  Reference scenario - macroeconomic drivers 
  
Macroeconomic drivers for emissions (average growth rate per annum) 
GDP 
2005-
2007 
2007-
2012 
2012-
2020 
2005-
2020 Population 
2005-
2007 
2007-
2012 
2012-
2020 
2005-
2020 
FRA 2.43 0.27 1.53 1.23 FRA 1.42 0.24 0.57 0.57 
DEU 3.24 0.75 1.63 1.55 DEU -0.29 -0.05 -0.12 -0.12 
ITA 2.04 -1.06 1.32 0.61 ITA 2.07 0.29 0.83 0.80 
ESP 3.49 -0.78 0.76 0.60 ESP 4.61 0.73 1.82 1.80 
UK 2.65 -0.31 1.97 1.30 UK 1.65 0.19 0.66 0.63 
POL 6.08 2.99 3.15 3.48 POL -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 
RWEU 2.97 0.06 2.03 1.50 RWEU 1.61 0.25 0.64 0.64 
REU27 3.11 -0.10 2.06 1.47 REU27 -0.07 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 
USA 2.30 0.81 1.96 1.62 USA 2.44 0.39 0.97 0.97 
JPN 2.52 0.57 1.52 1.34 JPN -0.12 0.00 -0.08 -0.06 
KOR 5.81 3.18 2.94 3.40 KOR 1.36 0.24 0.23 0.37 
BRA 5.36 4.18 4.34 4.43 BRA 2.45 0.43 0.97 1.01 
RUS 7.87 1.88 4.81 4.22 RUS -0.96 -0.20 -0.39 -0.40 
CHN 12.16 8.02 6.86 7.94 CHN 1.58 0.25 0.63 0.63 
IND 8.88 7.16 7.52 7.58 IND 3.63 0.53 1.44 1.42 
AUS 3.26 2.72 4.12 3.53 AUS 3.97 0.76 1.27 1.42 
RoW 3.94 1.97 2.80 2.67 RoW 3.00 0.56 1.19 1.25 
EU27 2.88 0.02 1.70 1.29 EU27 1.18 0.17 0.49 0.47 
                                                          
26 As a condition for being a Cournot strategic competitor, we require that the price elasticity of strategic demand (for the IRTS 
supplier) must be greater than 1. This price elasticity is estimated endogenously during simulation runs using equations (2)-(4). If 
the condition is not satisfied, the IRTS supplier is assumed to behave as a price taker just like other CRTS producers. 
27 In this situation, it is immaterial whether government mandatory renewable share target is imposed with or without government 
subsidy. This latter consideration only affects the nominal distribution of the burden of adjustment (to achieve the mandatory 
targets) but not the efficiency of the adjustment which is determined only by the magnitudes of the mandatory targets. For these 
magnitudes to be described as ‘optimal’, we use condition (8) as discussed in previous section 4. 
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Table 2:  Reference scenario - emission intensities (kg CO2e/$) 
Region 
Historical Projected 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2012 2016 2020 
FRA 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.15 
DEU 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.24 
ITA 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.23 
ESP 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.28 
UK 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.24 
POL 1.17 1.14 1.06 1.05 1.03 1.02 0.99 
RWEU 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 
REU27 0.67 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.61 0.59 
USA 0.51 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.46 0.45 
JPN 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.21 
KOR 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.51 0.50 0.48 
BRA 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.43 0.40 0.38 
RUS 2.57 2.47 2.27 2.27 2.29 2.21 2.13 
CHN 2.43 2.39 2.25 2.23 2.12 1.99 1.86 
IND 1.57 1.55 1.50 1.52 1.48 1.47 1.46 
AUS 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.51 0.49 
RoW 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.94 
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Table 3:  Reference scenario – CO2 emissions 
CO2 emissions by regions CO2 emissions by type of sectors 
Regions 
(GtCO2/year) % 
change 
2005-
2020 
ETS 
sectors 
total 
(GtCO2/year) % 
change 
2005-
2020 2005 2012 2020 2005 2012 2020 
FRA 0.38 0.36 0.38 1.0 FRA 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.4 
DEU 0.77 0.76 0.81 5.6 DEU 0.42 0.43 0.46 10.2 
ITA 0.44 0.41 0.42 -5.4 ITA 0.21 0.20 0.20 -3.5 
ESP 0.33 0.34 0.35 4.1 ESP 0.17 0.18 0.18 4.4 
UK 0.59 0.58 0.64 8.5 UK 0.29 0.31 0.35 19.3 
POL 0.28 0.34 0.42 48.0 POL 0.20 0.25 0.31 51.6 
RWEU 0.58 0.58 0.64 10.5 RWEU 0.29 0.29 0.32 9.5 
REU27 0.56 0.56 0.62 10.7 REU27 0.35 0.35 0.39 10.8 
EU27 3.94 3.92 4.28 8.7 EU27 2.04 2.12 2.31 13.2 
Regions 
(GtCO2/year) % 
change 
2005-
2020 
Non-ETS 
sectors 
total 
(GtCO2/year) % 
change 
2005-
2020 2005 2012 2020 2005 2012 2020 
USA 6.08 6.31 6.93 13.9 FRA 0.27 0.26 0.27 1.2 
JPN 1.08 1.12 1.21 12.2 DEU 0.36 0.33 0.36 0.2 
KOR 0.38 0.47 0.58 49.8 ITA 0.23 0.21 0.22 -7.2 
BRA 0.30 0.36 0.43 40.3 ESP 0.16 0.16 0.17 3.9 
RUS 1.56 1.87 2.54 62.7 UK 0.30 0.26 0.29 -2.1 
CHN 4.97 8.61 14.61 194.2 POL 0.08 0.09 0.11 39.0 
IND 1.10 1.87 3.53 220.7 RWEU 0.29 0.29 0.33 11.5 
AUS 0.37 0.42 0.48 28.6 REU27 0.20 0.20 0.23 10.4 
RoW 6.95 8.10 9.38 34.9 EU27 1.89 1.80 1.97 3.8 
World 26.73 33.06 43.95 64.4  
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Table 4:  EU-ETS scenario - CO2 emissions 
CO2 emissions by regions CO2 emissions by type of sectors 
Regions 
(GtCO2/year) % 
change 
2005-
2020 
ETS 
sectors 
total 
(GtCO2/year) % 
change 
2005-
2020 2005 2012 2020 2005 2012 2020 
FRA 0.38 0.33 0.33 -13.7 FRA 0.11 0.09 0.09 -19.3 
DEU 0.77 0.70 0.66 -14.5 DEU 0.42 0.39 0.34 -17.5 
ITA 0.44 0.37 0.34 -23.3 ITA 0.21 0.17 0.14 -34.0 
ESP 0.33 0.31 0.29 -14.0 ESP 0.17 0.16 0.14 -20.8 
UK 0.59 0.50 0.49 -16.7 UK 0.29 0.27 0.25 -12.8 
POL 0.28 0.27 0.26 -6.4 POL 0.20 0.20 0.18 -10.8 
RWEU 0.58 0.53 0.53 -9.0 RWEU 0.29 0.26 0.24 -17.0 
REU27 0.56 0.48 0.44 -20.8 REU27 0.35 0.30 0.25 -28.3 
EU27 3.94 3.50 3.34 -15.2 EU27 2.04 1.85 1.63 -20.0 
Regions 
(GtCO2/year) % 
change 
2005-
2020 
Non-ETS 
sectors 
total 
(GtCO2/year) % 
change 
2005-
2020 2005 2012 2020 2005 2012 2020 
USA 6.08 6.64 7.31 20.2 FRA 0.27 0.24 0.24 -11.5 
JPN 1.08 1.14 1.21 12.5 DEU 0.36 0.31 0.32 -11.0 
KOR 0.38 0.47 0.58 50.2 ITA 0.23 0.20 0.20 -13.7 
BRA 0.30 0.37 0.43 41.3 ESP 0.16 0.15 0.15 -6.8 
RUS 1.56 2.10 2.93 88.1 UK 0.30 0.23 0.24 -20.5 
CHN 4.97 9.24 15.70 216.0 POL 0.08 0.07 0.08 4.8 
IND 1.10 1.85 3.07 178.6 RWEU 0.29 0.27 0.29 -1.0 
AUS 0.37 0.44 0.52 39.9 REU27 0.20 0.18 0.19 -7.8 
RoW 6.95 8.19 9.59 38.0 EU27 1.89 1.65 1.71 -10.0 
World 30.67 37.42 48.01 56.6  
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5.2 Results 
Tables 5-6 show the emission permit price (in US2004$/tCO2)28
De
 for the EU-ETS scenario under 
various assumptions about the electricity market structure and price elasticity of supply and 
demand in the market. For a standard analysis, we assume the aggregate price elasticity of 
demand for the electricity market ( ) in all regions to be equal to 2 (this is consistent with the 
empirical findings in Wade (2005), Espey and Espey (2004), for example) and the price 
elasticity of supply for all non-hydro renewable electricity ( SCe ) as being equal to 3 (also 
consistent with the empirical findings in studies such as Johnson (2010) for the USA).29
De
 For 
sensitivity analysis, we can allow for  to take on higher values such as 3 and 4 (but not a 
lower value such as 1 because such a low value will imply the price elasticity of strategic 
demand for all IRTS suppliers will be less than 1 and this means all IRTS producers will revert 
back to being price takers in a perfectly competitive market which is the case considered under 
the heading of PC (perfectly competitive) scenario).30
S
Ce
 For sensitivity analysis, we also allow the 
price elasticity of supply of non-hydro renewable electricity ( ) to take on values ranging 
from 1 to 6. We therefore label the various scenarios for sensitivity analysis as follows: PC-f-r = 
perfect competition scenario with price elasticity of supply of fossil-fuel based electricity being 
equal to f and price elasticity of supply of renewable electricity assumed to be equal to r. 
Similarly with scenarios ICN-f-r and ICW-f-r; although in the case of IC scenarios, only the 
price elasticity of supply of CRTS fossil-fuel based electricity (i.e. ElyGas and ElyOil) are 
relevant because the ‘supply’ of IRTS electricity is determined by strategic Cournot competitive 
behaviour rather than by a simple supply curve. 
From Table 5, it can be seen that under the perfectly competitive (PC) market assumption, the 
permit price for the EU-ETS trading sector31
                                                          
28 We use the GTAP data base version 7, see Narayanan, B and Walmsley, T. (2008), which has a base year of 2004, hence all 
values are in US$2004. 
 will start from a zero value in 2005 and rise to a 
level of about $14/tCO2 in 2020 for the PC-3-r scenarios (r can range from 1 to 6 without 
affecting the results greatly), but to a higher value of nearly $38/tCO2 in 2020 for the PC-1-r 
scenarios (again irrespective of the value of m). This result shows clearly that the emission price 
for the PC scenarios is crucially dependent only on the price elasticity of supply of fossil-fuel 
based electricity and not that of renewable electricity. This is as expected and can be explained 
as follows. a lower/higher price elasticity of supply of fossil-fuel based electricity implies a 
‘steeper’/’flatter’ supply curve and therefore, all things remaining the same, a larger/smaller 
shift in the supply curve (caused by the permit price or carbon tax) will be required to reduce 
supply by any given amount. The price elasticity of supply of renewable electricity therefore is 
not a crucial parameter in determining the permit price (see also Figure 8 for an overall 
summary) However, it is an important factor for determining the market share of renewable 
electricity as can be seen in Table 6. This is also as expected because the larger the price 
elasticity of supply of renewable electricity, the easier it would be for renewable electricity to 
gain market share following a given increase in electricity price. From Table 6, it can be seen 
that the market share of renewable electricity will increase from a level of about 4.5% (for the 
EU27 as a whole) in 2005 to a level in 2020 which depends on the relative magnitudes of the 
supply elasticity of coal-based electricity and that of renewable electricity. If the latter is much 
larger than the former (i.e., for scenarios PC-1-3, PC-2-5, PC-3-6 in Table 6) then the increase 
29 In all cases, price elasticity of supply of hydro and nuclear electricity is kept at 1.5. 
30 It turns out that the aggregate price elasticity of demand of electricity does not affect the results greatly (in terms of a 
comparison between PC and IC scenarios)   
31 We focus mainly on the trading sector, but Table 5 also gives the shadow emission permit price for the non-trading sector which 
is always much higher than that for the trading sector and often not affected greatly by assumptions regarding price elasticities in 
the electricity sector. 
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in market share of renewable electricity will be most significant (around 25%-35% in 2020). On 
the other hand, if it is much lower (i.e. scenarios PC-2-1, PC-3-1 in Table 6) then the increase in 
market share of renewable electricity will be minimal. If the targeted increase in market share 
for renewable electricity is about 20% in 2020 then from Table 6, this seems to require that the 
price elasticity of supply of renewable electricity would have to be about twice the level of the 
price elasticity of supply of coal-based electricity (i.e. for scenarios PC-1-2, PC-2-4, and PC-3-
5) (see also Figure 9 for an overall summary). 
Tables 7-8 shows the results for the cases of imperfectly competitive market with no 
government intervention (ICN) and Tables 9-10 shows similar results for the cases of 
imperfectly competitive market with government intervention (ICW). In these case, the permit 
price for the EU-ETS trading sector in the year 2020 is also seen to be dependent only on the 
price elasticity of supply of fossil-fuel based electricity and not that of renewable electricity (as 
in the case of PC scenarios). However, with coal-based electricity now behaves as Cournot 
competitor rather than perfect competitor, the price elasticity of supply of ‘fossil-fuel’ based 
electricity now only refer to gas and oil-based electricity supply, therefore, this takes out some 
of the sensitivity of permit price with respect to those price elasticities (as can also be seen from 
Figure 8). In general, the permit prices of the ICN scenarios are higher than those of the PC 
scenarios as expected (except for scenarios PC-1-r  where the permit prices are highly sensitive 
to coal-based elasticity of supply). The permit prices of ICW scenarios, however, are much 
closer to those of the PC scenarios (again except for scenarios PC-1-r).  
Turning to market shares, Table 8 shows that market share of renewable electricity is much 
lower for ICN scenarios as compared to PC (or ICW) scenarios and stay very much unchanged 
from the base year at the level of around 5-8%. In contrast, these market shares are much higher 
and closer to the results of the PC scenarios if the ICW scenarios are considered. The market 
shares are similar to those of the PC scenarios if price elasticity of supply of gas and oil-based 
electricity is assumed to be around 2, but will be slightly lower (slightly higher) than the results 
of PC scenarios if this price elasticity of supply falls to 1 (rise to 3) due primarily to the 
sensitivity of the PC results. Overall, a market share of 20% for renewable electricity in the 
EU27 for the year 2020 can be achieved if the ratio of price elasticity of supply of renewable 
electricity to that of gas and oil-based electricity is around the ratio of 4/3 to 3/1, i.e. for 
scenarios ICW-1-3, ICW-2-4, and ICW-3-4 (see Figure 9). 
Table 11 shows the details of market shares of non-hydro renewable electricity for individual 
EU27 countries in the years 2005 and 2020 for the ICW-3-4 scenario. It can be seen here that 
the most significant contribution to renewable electricity shares in 2020 is mostly from wind 
technology (ElyWind) and this primarily comes from Germany (DEU), Spain (ESP), Italy 
(ITA), the UK (UK) and the ‘rest of western EU region’ (RWEU), while France (FRA) still 
relies heavily on nuclear electricity (ElyNu) and Poland (POL) on coal-based electricity 
(ElyCoa).  
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Table 5:  Emission permit price ($/tCO2) for the EU-ETS-PC scenarios under various assumptions 
regarding price elasticities of supply and demand in the electricity market 
Scenarios 
Year 
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 
 EU-ETS non-trading sectors 
All scenarios (*) 7.64 34.71 44.92 68.34 73.54 79.60 85.91 93.21 
 EU-ETS trading sectors 
PC-1-1 1.98 5.69 9.55 14.75 19.84 25.49 31.42 37.51 
PC-1-2 1.99 5.72 9.60 14.84 19.96 25.64 31.59 37.66 
PC-1-3 2.00 5.74 9.64 14.91 20.05 25.74 31.69 37.78 
PC-2-1 1.24 3.41 5.38 8.23 10.97 13.96 17.05 20.19 
PC-2-2 1.24 3.42 5.40 8.27 11.03 14.06 17.19 20.37 
PC-2-3 1.25 3.43 5.42 8.30 11.09 14.14 17.27 20.44 
PC-2-4 1.25 3.45 5.44 8.34 11.13 14.18 17.32 20.47 
PC-2-5 1.26 3.46 5.46 8.36 11.16 14.22 17.35 20.53 
PC-3-1 0.93 2.48 3.71 5.67 7.55 9.59 11.69 13.81 
PC-3-2 0.93 2.48 3.73 5.69 7.59 9.65 11.78 13.92 
PC-3-3 0.94 2.49 3.74 5.72 7.63 9.71 11.84 13.99 
PC-3-4 0.94 2.50 3.75 5.74 7.65 9.74 11.88 14.03 
PC-3-5 0.94 2.51 3.76 5.75 7.68 9.77 11.90 14.05 
PC-3-6 0.94 2.51 3.77 5.77 7.69 9.79 11.93 14.07 
Average 1.27 3.52 5.60 8.60 11.50 14.69 17.99 21.34 
Notes: PC-f-r implies perfect competition assumption with price elasticity of supply of fossil-fuel based electricity being equal to f, 
and that of renewable electricity equal to r; in all cases, price elasticity of supply of hydro and nuclear electricity is kept at 1.5 and 
aggregate price electricity of demand for the electricity market as a whole is kept at 2. 
     (*) The results for the EU-ETS non-trading sectors remain essentially unchanged for all scenarios, hence only the average 
value for all scenarios is displayed.  
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Table 6:  Market shares (%) for different electricity generation technologies in the EU27 in 2020 for 
the EU-ETS-PC scenarios under various assumptions regarding price elasticities of supply and 
demand in the electricity market 
Scenarios 
Year 
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 
PC-1-1 4.52 4.92 5.41 6.30 7.07 7.98 8.95 9.99 
PC-1-2 4.53 5.27 6.25 8.07 9.77 12.05 15.03 18.97 
PC-1-3 4.53 5.62 7.12 10.10 13.38 18.52 26.08 36.40 
PC-2-1 4.52 4.81 5.13 5.72 6.18 6.73 7.28 7.83 
PC-2-2 4.53 5.01 5.59 6.63 7.52 8.58 9.74 11.02 
PC-2-3 4.53 5.21 6.04 7.60 9.00 10.82 13.04 15.80 
PC-2-4 4.53 5.41 6.51 8.64 10.76 13.76 17.76 23.04 
PC-2-5 4.54 5.60 6.99 9.83 12.94 17.67 24.29 33.04 
PC-3-1 4.52 4.77 5.03 5.50 5.86 6.29 6.71 7.12 
PC-3-2 4.53 4.91 5.33 6.11 6.74 7.48 8.25 9.04 
PC-3-3 4.53 5.05 5.64 6.74 7.67 8.81 10.07 11.49 
PC-3-4 4.53 5.19 5.95 7.39 8.70 10.37 12.38 14.83 
PC-3-5 4.54 5.33 6.26 8.10 9.87 12.28 15.38 19.32 
PC-3-6 4.54 5.46 6.58 8.86 11.23 14.63 19.19 25.15 
See Table 5 for notes. 
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Table 7:  Emission permit price ($/tCO2) for the EU-ETS-ICN scenario under various assumptions 
regarding price elasticities of supply and demand in the electricity market 
Scenarios 
Year 
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 
 EU-ETS non-trading sectors 
All scenarios (*) 7.63 34.73 45.09 68.66 74.02 80.29 86.89 94.63 
  EU-ETS trading sectors 
ICN-1-1 1.45 4.19 7.01 10.80 14.49 18.58 22.94 27.58 
ICN-1-2 1.45 4.19 7.01 10.81 14.49 18.58 22.94 27.57 
ICN-1-3 1.45 4.19 7.01 10.81 14.49 18.58 22.94 27.57 
ICN-2-1 1.34 3.80 6.19 9.51 12.67 16.15 19.84 23.77 
ICN-2-2 1.34 3.80 6.19 9.51 12.67 16.15 19.84 23.77 
ICN-2-3 1.34 3.80 6.20 9.51 12.67 16.15 19.84 23.76 
ICN-2-4 1.34 3.80 6.20 9.51 12.67 16.15 19.84 23.76 
ICN-2-5 1.34 3.81 6.20 9.51 12.67 16.15 19.76 23.53 
ICN-3-1 1.23 3.46 5.51 8.45 11.23 14.30 17.55 21.02 
ICN-3-2 1.23 3.46 5.51 8.45 11.23 14.30 17.55 21.02 
ICN-3-3 1.23 3.46 5.51 8.45 11.24 14.30 17.55 21.01 
ICN-3-4 1.23 3.46 5.51 8.45 11.24 14.30 17.54 21.01 
ICN-3-5 1.23 3.46 5.52 8.20 10.77 13.64 16.71 20.00 
ICN-3-6 1.23 3.29 5.11 7.82 10.43 13.33 16.42 19.74 
Notes: ICN-f-r implies imperfect competition with no government intervention; price elasticity of supply of fossil-fuel based 
electricity being equal to f, and that of renewable electricity equal to r; in all cases, price elasticity of supply of hydro and nuclear 
electricity is kept at 1.5 and aggregate price electricity of demand for the electricity market as a whole is kept at 2. 
     (*) The results for the EU-ETS non-trading sectors remain essentially unchanged for all scenarios, hence only the average 
value for all scenarios is displayed. 
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Table 8:  Market shares (%) for different electricity generation technologies in the EU27 in 2020 for 
the EU-ETS-ICN scenarios under various assumptions regarding price elasticities of supply and 
demand in the electricity market 
Scenarios 
Year 
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 
ICN-1-1 4.52 4.65 4.85 5.11 5.32 5.53 5.74 5.94 
ICN-1-2 4.52 4.66 4.98 5.35 5.65 5.96 6.27 6.56 
ICN-1-3 4.51 4.68 5.12 5.59 5.99 6.40 6.81 7.22 
ICN-2-1 4.52 4.65 4.85 5.12 5.32 5.54 5.76 5.96 
ICN-2-2 4.51 4.66 4.97 5.33 5.62 5.92 6.22 6.51 
ICN-2-3 4.51 4.67 5.09 5.54 5.93 6.32 6.71 7.10 
ICN-2-4 4.51 4.69 5.22 5.76 6.25 6.73 7.22 7.72 
ICN-2-5 4.50 4.70 5.34 5.98 6.58 7.16 7.77 8.34 
ICN-3-1 4.52 4.65 4.84 5.12 5.32 5.54 5.75 5.96 
ICN-3-2 4.51 4.66 4.96 5.31 5.59 5.89 6.18 6.46 
ICN-3-3 4.51 4.67 5.07 5.50 5.88 6.25 6.62 6.99 
ICN-3-4 4.51 4.68 5.18 5.70 6.17 6.62 7.08 7.56 
ICN-3-5 4.50 4.69 5.30 5.87 6.34 6.81 7.28 7.77 
ICN-3-6 4.50 4.68 5.30 5.86 6.39 6.90 7.43 7.99 
See Table 7 for notes. 
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Table 9:  Emission permit price ($/tCO2) for the EU-ETS-ICW scenario under various assumptions 
regarding price elasticities of supply and demand in the electricity market 
Scenarios 
Year 
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 
 EU-ETS non-trading sectors 
All scenarios (*) 7.64 34.73 45.07 68.61 73.92 80.10 86.55 94.05 
  EU-ETS trading sectors 
ICW-1-1 1.45 4.19 7.01 10.80 14.49 18.58 22.94 27.58 
ICW-1-2 1.37 3.94 6.53 9.93 13.14 16.58 20.09 23.64 
ICW-1-3 1.34 3.81 6.26 9.41 12.28 15.23 18.65 22.08 
ICW-2-1 1.31 3.70 6.01 9.20 12.22 15.53 19.01 22.68 
ICW-2-2 1.27 3.60 5.82 8.85 11.67 14.71 17.83 21.04 
ICW-2-3 1.24 3.49 5.61 8.45 11.03 13.83 16.81 19.85 
ICW-2-4 1.21 3.39 5.39 8.08 10.61 13.32 16.13 19.01 
ICW-2-5 1.18 3.28 5.26 7.90 10.38 13.04 15.81 18.72 
ICW-3-1 1.21 3.38 5.38 8.23 10.92 13.86 16.97 20.28 
ICW-3-2 1.18 3.31 5.24 7.98 10.53 13.29 16.15 19.13 
ICW-3-3 1.16 3.23 5.09 7.69 10.07 12.64 15.32 18.11 
ICW-3-4 1.14 3.15 4.93 7.36 9.62 12.07 14.59 17.16 
ICW-3-5 1.11 3.03 4.66 6.99 9.17 11.52 13.92 16.39 
ICW-3-6 1.09 2.95 4.47 6.73 8.84 11.16 13.53 15.91 
Notes: ICW-f-r implies imperfect competition with no government intervention; price elasticity of supply of fossil-fuel based 
electricity being equal to f, and that of renewable electricity equal to r; in all cases, price elasticity of supply of hydro and nuclear 
electricity is kept at 1.5 and aggregate price electricity of demand for the electricity market as a whole is kept at 2. 
     (*) The results for the EU-ETS non-trading sectors remain essentially unchanged for all scenarios, hence only the average 
value for all scenarios is displayed. 
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Table 10:  Market shares (%) for different electricity generation technologies in the EU27 in 2020 for 
the EU-ETS-ICW scenarios under various assumptions regarding price elasticities of supply and 
demand in the electricity market 
Scenarios 
Year 
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 
ICW-1-1 4.52 4.65 4.85 5.11 5.32 5.53 5.74 5.94 
ICW-1-2 4.52 5.08 5.90 7.29 8.55 10.10 11.93 14.14 
ICW-1-3 4.51 5.28 6.47 8.48 10.43 12.96 16.29 20.74 
ICW-2-1 4.52 4.85 5.26 5.97 6.56 7.26 8.01 8.81 
ICW-2-2 4.51 5.05 5.78 7.04 8.15 9.50 11.05 12.87 
ICW-2-3 4.51 5.23 6.28 8.09 9.79 11.95 14.69 18.16 
ICW-2-4 4.51 5.40 6.76 9.14 11.52 14.77 19.08 24.67 
ICW-2-5 4.50 5.55 7.23 10.23 13.47 18.13 24.31 32.79 
ICW-3-1 4.52 4.83 5.21 5.87 6.41 7.05 7.73 8.45 
ICW-3-2 4.51 5.02 5.68 6.83 7.83 9.03 10.39 11.97 
ICW-3-3 4.51 5.19 6.13 7.78 9.30 11.14 13.38 16.19 
ICW-3-4 4.51 5.34 6.57 8.70 10.68 13.36 16.70 20.98 
ICW-3-5 4.50 5.49 6.84 9.29 11.73 15.16 19.68 25.57 
ICW-3-6 4.50 5.60 7.09 10.03 13.13 17.70 23.98 32.19 
See Table 9 for notes. 
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Table 11:  Market shares (%) for different electricity generation technologies in individual EU27 
countries for the base year 2005 and target year 2020 for the ICW-3-4 scenario 
Region 
Technology Total 
non-
Hydro 
Renew
able 
ElyCoa ElyOil ElyGas ElyBio ElyNu ElyHyd ElySol ElyWind ElyOth 
 2005 
FRA 4.5 1.2 3.8 0.9 78.8 10.6 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.1 
DEU 48.4 1.5 12.2 2.7 27.7 3.2 0.1 4.2 0.0 7.0 
ITA 16.1 14.6 50.4 2.3 0.0 14.1 0.0 0.6 1.9 4.8 
ESP 21.9 7.6 21.1 1.5 27.5 13.4 0.0 6.8 0.0 8.3 
UK 38.4 1.3 35.7 2.4 20.7 1.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 2.9 
POL 94.6 1.5 2.0 0.8 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.9 
RWEU 18.4 2.1 23.5 5.7 27.3 21.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 7.7 
REU27 41.0 6.2 14.8 0.9 24.3 12.2 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.5 
Total 
EU27 30.3 3.8 19.5 2.4 31.7 10.2 0.0 1.9 0.2 4.5 
 2020 
FRA 2.2 0.4 1.4 1.5 80.9 10.9 1.2 1.4 0.0 4.2 
DEU 35.1 0.7 11.8 5.0 26.9 3.1 0.4 17.1 0.0 22.4 
ITA 8.8 7.0 48.1 4.5 0.0 18.2 0.1 3.4 10.0 17.9 
ESP 2.8 1.3 7.6 1.3 15.3 7.8 0.2 63.7 0.0 65.2 
UK 27.4 0.8 35.7 5.3 24.7 1.3 0.0 5.0 0.0 10.2 
POL 92.2 1.1 2.1 1.9 0.0 1.5 0.0 1.2 0.0 3.1 
RWEU 8.2 0.9 17.4 10.2 25.8 20.0 0.1 17.3 0.0 27.7 
REU27 30.9 3.4 12.5 2.2 30.4 15.4 0.0 5.1 0.2 7.5 
Total 
EU27 18.2 1.6 14.8 4.1 31.5 10.2 0.3 18.5 0.8 23.7 
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Figure 8:  Sensitivity of emissions permit price in the year 2020 with respect to the price elasticities of 
supply of fossil-fuel based (f) and renewable (r) electricity - indicated by f-r on the horizontal axis 
 
 
Figure 9:  Sensitivity of renewable electricity market share in the year 2020 with respect to the price 
elasticities of supply of fossil-fuel based (f) and renewable (r) electricity - indicated by f-r on the 
horizontal axis 
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6. Conclusion. 
Climate change is an important and highly complex issue and therefore to tackle with this issue, 
often a combination of different policy targets and instruments are used. In Australia, for 
example, the Australian government climate change policy consists of the introduction of a 
carbon tax (since July 1, 2012) and also some energy policy components aiming at encouraging 
business investment in renewable energy technology in the electricity generation sector.32
  
 In the 
European Union, this multiple-policy approach is seen more clearly with a policy ‘package’ 
which seeks to impose, not just one policy target but three: a 20 % reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions relative to 1990 level, a 20 % renewable energy share in consumption activities and a 
20% improvement in energy efficiency by the year 2020. Because of this multiple-targeting 
approach, there have been some debate concerning the efficiency of this approach. On the one 
hand, there is a view that multiple-targeting policy is inefficient (see for example Böhringer et 
al., 2009) while on the other hand, there is the contrary view that such a policy is not only 
helpful but necessary (see for example, Kemfert and Diekman, 2009). In this paper, we examine 
this issue by looking at the characteristics of the electricity generation sector. We suggest that if 
the sector can be characterised as perfectly competitive with all suppliers acting price takers and 
using constant returns to scale technologies then the first view can be considered as valid. On 
the other hand, if the market in this sector is imperfectly competitive, with some increasing 
returns to scale coal-based electricity suppliers acting as natural monopolists or as Cournot 
strategic competitors then climate change policy which has only one policy component (such as 
carbon tax, or emissions trading scheme) may be inefficient. In this case, the use of a secondary 
(energy) policy component such as mandatory renewable electricity (or energy) targeting may 
be helpful or even necessary, depending on crucial assumptions regarding the price elasticity of 
supply of renewable. In the case of the EU climate change policy package, we found that if the 
price elasticity of supply of renewable electricity is about twice the level of the price elasticity 
of supply of fossil-fuel based electricity then a mandatory renewable electricity share target of 
about 20% in the year 2020 would seem to be reasonable and near the optimal level. If however, 
the reverse is true, i.e. the price elasticity of supply of renewable electricity is only about half 
the level of the price elasticity of supply of fossil-fuel based electricity then the target for 
renewable electricity share in the year 2020 should be only about half of that target, i.e. 10%. 
This shows that future studies on the issue of renewable electricity targeting should concentrate 
on the empirical measurement of the price elasticity of supply of renewable electricity, and also 
on the question of how far, government policies (such as subsidies on R&D investment) can 
influence the magnitudes of these elasticities in the long run. 
                                                          
32 See Commonwealth of Australia (2012). 
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Appendix A 
Derivation of the optimal subsidy 
The optimal subsidy can be defined by the following optimization problem: 


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I
Q
Q CCCCC
Q
Q II
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 (A1) 
subject to the quantity constraint 
0==+ dQdQdQ CI  (A2) 
where PC(QC) is the supply function for CRTS (i.e. renewable) electricity, T (QI) is the carbon 
tax or marginal abatement cost function for IRTS (fossil-fuel based) electricity. The terms in the 
square brackets on the right hand side of equation (1) represent the areas GHKL and N’N*N** of 
Figure 7 respectively. From equation (1), the first order condition for optimal subsidy can be 
derived: 
CCCCCII dQQPQPdQQT
dW
)]()([)(
0
'' −+−=
=
 (A3) 
which gives (using (2)): 
 taxcarbon)()]()([subsidy '' ==−= ICCCC QTQPQP  (A4) 
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Appendix B 
Details on sectoral and regional aggregation in the WIATEC model 
The WIATEC model can use different regional and sectoral aggregations for different studies 
depending on the focus of analysis. For this particular study, we concentrate on some individual 
EU member countries to highlight their differences in the use of different techniques for 
generating electricity (see Table B1). For the sectors, we distinguish between basic energy 
producing sectors (the first five sectors in Table B2), agricultural sectors, energy intensive and 
manufacturing sectors, transport sectors, and other services sectors 
Table B1:  Details on regional aggregation  
No. Region Description 
1 FRA France 
2 DEU Germany 
3 ITA  Italy 
4 ESP Spain 
5 UK The United Kingdom 
6 POL Poland 
7 RWEU Rest of Western Europe which belong to EU27 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden) 
8 REU27 Rest of Eastern and Southern Europe which belong to EU27 (Cyprus, Greece, Malta, 
Portugal, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Bulgaria, Romania) 
9 USA United States 
10 JPN Japan 
11 KOR Republic of Korea (South Korea) 
12 BRA  Brazil 
13 RUS Russian Federation 
14 CHN China & Hong Kong 
15 IND India 
16 AUS Australia 
17 RoW  Rest of the World 
Note: Regions 1-8 sum up to EU27. Switzerland and Norway do not belong to EU27; hence they are included in RoW. 
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Table B2:  Details on sectoral aggregation 
No. Sector Description 
1 coa coal mining 
2 oil crude oil 
3 gas natural gas extraction + gas distribution 
4 p_c refined oil products 
5 ely Electricity disaggregated into different technologies: ElyCoa, ElyGas, ElyOil, ElyBio, ElyNu, 
ElyHydro, ElySol, ElyWind, ElyOth. 
6 CROPS paddy rice, wheat, cereal grains nec, vegetables, fruit, nuts, oil seeds, sugar cane, sugar beet, 
plant-based fibers, crops nec. 
7 OAGFF other agriculture (bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses, animal products nec, raw milk, wool, 
silk-worm cocoons), forestry, and fishing 
8 MIN minerals nec 
9 CRP chemical, rubber, plastic production    
10 EII  energy intensive industries (ferrous and non-ferrous metals, metal products).  
11 OMF other manufacturing (textiles, wearing apparel , leather, wood, and paper products, 
publishing, motor vehicles and parts, transport equipment nec, electronic equipment, 
machinery and equipment nec, manufactures nec). 
12 TRN transport (air, water, sea, land) 
13 SER services (water, construction, trade, communication, financial, insurance, business services 
nec, recreational, public admin., defence, education, health, ownership of dwellings). 
 
